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Abstract—The various types of communication technologies
and mobility features in Internet of Things (IoT) on the one
hand enable fruitful and attractive applications, but on the
other hand facilitates malware propagation, thereby raising new
challenges on handling IoT-empowered malware for cyber secu-
rity. Comparing with the malware propagation control scheme
in traditional wireless networks where nodes can be directly
repaired and secured, in IoT, compromised end devices are diffi-
cult to be patched. Alternatively, blocking malware via patching
intermediate nodes turns out to be a more feasible and practical
solution. Specifically, patching intermediate nodes can effectively
prevent the proliferation of malware propagation by securing
infrastructure links and limiting malware propagation to local
device-to-device dissemination. This article proposes a novel
traffic-aware patching scheme to select important intermediate
nodes to patch, which applies to the IoT system with limited
patching resources and response time constraint. Experiments
on real-world trace datasets in IoT networks are conducted
to demonstrate the advantage of the proposed traffic-aware
patching scheme in alleviating malware propagation.
Index Terms—heterogeneous links, IoT malware, patching
I. INTRODUCTION
By integrating the ability of sensing physical world and
the privilege in availing communication capabilities, Internet
of Things (IoT) enables close interactions between humans
and machines. IoT generally consists of numerous end IoT
devices for sensing and action, intermediate nodes with wired
connectivity for data relaying, and application servers in
the cloud for data controlling and analysis. Typically, IoT
devices can communicate with each other with minimal human
intervention and build an autonomous and complex network.
As the boundary between machines and humans gets blurry,
adversaries in the cyberspace can threaten human users safety
and privacy in the physical world. Obviously, the growing
popularity of devices with rich wireless communication capa-
bilities has made IoT attractive to digital viruses and malicious
contents. Consequently, in recent years the security issues in
IoT has been an ever-increasing concern [1]–[3].
From an adversary’s perspective, the unique features of IoT
facilitate the exploits of devices as well as the propagation
of IoT malware. These features include constrained resources,
heterogeneous links, and vulnerable usability, which are dis-
cussed as follows.
Resource-constrained IoT devices. Comparing with the in-
termediate nodes located at the end side of the infras-
tructure with wired connectivity, IoT devices designed
to perform simple sensing and actuation operations have
limited computation and communication capabilities. In
this case, the algorithm and mechanism applied on IoT
devices are relatively simple. As a result, the attacker can
spend much less resource to break in IoT devices, ren-
dering them the targets of malicious users. For example,
due to the overhead of certificate management and public-
key cryptography, many existing IoT devices fail to
support state-of-the-art secure communication protocols
(e.g., SSL/TLS). Therefore, the adversary can eavesdrop
on sensitive sensor data and even manipulate data without
being detected. Another example is that IoT devices
often have limited entropy sources, which results in weak
cryptographic keys that can be predicted by the attacker.
Moreover, since most IoT devices run on embedded
Linux OS, the attacker can easily create IoT malware by
recompiling existing Linux malware for other instruction
set architectures.
Heterogeneity. In order to support different kinds of IoT
applications, IoT devices are often equipped with het-
erogeneous communication and computation capabilities
for the purpose of seamless operations. However, the
heterogeneity and potentially vast amount of IoT devices
facilitate the fabrication of identity and hiding of mal-
ware. Moreover, as shown in Fig. 1, compromised IoT
devices might disseminate malware via heterogeneous
communication links as described below.
• Infrastructure links. IoT malware can propagate
using infrastructure-based communication technolo-
gies, such as GSM/GPRS/UMTS/LTE and WLAN,
via intermediate nodes, such as access point (AP),
base station (BS), or gateway. In particular, IoT
malware inherits the threats caused by computer
malware. Similar to computer malware, most IoT
malware families today scan the IP address space for
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Fig. 1. IoT platform with infrastructure and device-to-device links
vulnerable victims and spread via the Internet. Due
to the widespread use of weak login credentials and
the fact that many IoT devices are Internet-accessible,
some botnets have allegedly harvested more than one
million of infected IoT devices.1
• Device-to-device links. IoT malware could exploit
the proximity-based wireless media such as BLE,
Wi-Fi Direct, and NFC to infect the devices in the
vicinity [4]. In this case, IoT malware is stored
and forwarded by taking advantages of mobility and
ubiquity. For example, Colin OFlynn in Black Hat
USA 2016 as well as Ronen and Shamir [5] discussed
the possibility of light bulb worm, which allows a
reprogrammed bulb to re-flash nearby bulbs.
Usability. Security is only as strong as its weakest link, and
the weakest link, in many cases, is the humans who
implement, operate, and use the system. For example,
a proven secure cryptographic primitive, if implemented
or used incorrectly, can still be circumvented. Moreover,
users may choose to ignore or even bypass a security
mechanism if it prevents (e.g., due to slow performance,
badly designed user interface, and unclear instructions)
the users from doing what they meant to do. Since IoT
devices often lack convenient input and output interfaces,
the original security features might be bypassed by the
non-professional IT users, thereby increasing the possibil-
ity and risk of human errors and facilitating the spreading
of malware [2].
Obviously, the software updates and patching are necessary
to prevent the IoT devices from being compromised. A single
software flaw will make a tremendous range of IoT devices
vulnerable to attacks since software components are reused
in different devices.2 However, without a friendly interface to
get alerted about security updates, most users forget to update
software installed in IoT devices and leave them out-of-date. In
addition, without basic programming knowledge and security
awareness, users might be unwilling to perform manual-
download-and-install approach for the software update. As a
result, it is critical to design a reasonable solution to prevent
the occurrence of the large-scale malware propagation among
1http://thehackernews.com/2016/10/iot-dyn-ddos-attack.html
2http://blog.senr.io/blog/400000-publicly-available-iot-devices-vulnerable-
to-single-flaw
trillion of unpatched, insecure, and even compromised IoT
devices.
Instead of patching resource-constrained and UI-unfriendly
compromised IoT devices directly, this article introduces a
more feasible solution, where operators could only patch
or recover IoT devices via infrastructure, i.e., securing the
intermediate nodes. In this case, the patched AP, BS or
gateway could stop the malware propagation by patching via
infrastructure links. The concept of leveraging intermediate
nodes to improve IoT security has appeared in the recent
commercial product F-Secure SENSE.3 However, its main
purpose is to block malicious websites and IoT botnet masters
instead of considering securing important infrastructure links
between IoT devices and intermediate nodes. On the other
hand, the idea behind IoT Sentinel [6] is similar to our
solution, where the type of IoT devices are identified by
intermediate nodes, and the communications of vulnerable
IoT devices are constrained by enabling enforcement of rules.
Different from our solution, software-defined network (SDN)
is exploited in IoT Sentinel for network flow isolation and for
prevention of malware propagation.
With limited efforts and resources, the operator might not be
able to patch all intermediate nodes but only a portion of them.
One naive method is to simply patch those intermediate nodes
in a random order. However, a smarter approach is to protect
the most important node first, as suggested by the framework
of network robustness analysis [7], [8]. This article proposes a
traffic-aware patching scheme, where the operator patches the
intermediate nodes sequentially in a descending importance
order. In particular, an intermediate node who could contact
with a large number of IoT devices will be protected first.
Moreover, such volume-based patching approach is effective
to the current infamous DDoS attacks launched by IoT bots.
By leveraging a real-world trace datasets containing com-
munication history over device-to-device and infrastructure
links, we conduct an extensive experiment to demonstrate the
effect on constraining malware propagation via infrastructure
links. To the best of authors’ knowledge, this article is the
first work discussing the control of malware propagation from
the perspective of infection paths, which could avail the
damage estimation caused by the malware and improve the
development of attack detection methods for IoT networks.
II. HOW TO COMPROMISE IOT DEVICES?
IoT devices are an attractive attack target for cybercriminals:
IoT devices often employ weak security measures, and their
compromise can lead to privacy breaches and safety threats
in the real world. The insecurity of existing IoT devices
has been highlighted repeatedly by security researchers and
practitioners. Recently, several malware families were found
to target vulnerable IoT devices (e.g., routers, IP cameras,
and CCTVs) and form botnets for DDoS. It is estimated that
some IoT botnets comprise more than one million of infected
devices, and thus can generate high-volume DDoS traffic even
without amplification. For example, in September 2016, an IoT
3https://community.f-secure.com/t5/F-Secure-SENSE/What-are-the-
current-protection/ta-p/82972
3botnet called Mirai crippled a website with 620 Gbps of attack
traffic, which is almost twice as much as the biggest DDoS
attack witnessed in 2015. Later in October 2016, the same
botnet attacked the Dyn DNS service provider, taking down
a large portion of websites in the North America, including
GitHub, Twitter, Netflix, etc.4 At DEF CON 2016, security
researchers showed a proof-of-concept IoT ransomware that
demands ransom for a hacked smart thermostat, which will
be set to a high temperature without a timely payment.5 As
attackers are finding creative ways to monetize infected IoT
devices, it is inevitable to see an increase of new IoT malware
families that are more destructive and contagious than ever.
IoT malware can propagate via infrastructure links and/or
device-to-device links. We discuss both cases in this section.
A. Compromising IoT devices via infrastructure links
Many of the IoT malware families today propagate via
infrastructure links, particularly the Internet. Moreover, they
share a common infection and spreading pattern: The attacker
harvests new vulnerable IoT devices through address space
scanning. This scanning can be performed by external servers,
such as the C&C servers, or by the compromised devices.
The attacker targets Telnet- or SSH-accessible devices that use
default or weak login credentials and thus can easily obtain
root access permission by brute-force password cracking. Once
the attacker gets the shell of the hacked device, malware
payload will be downloaded and installed. IoTPOT [2], an
IoT honeypot project, observed at least four IoT malware
families that can propagate via Telnet. In addition to cracking
weak passwords, some malware also exploits software vulner-
abilities. For example, CCTV-targeting RADIATION malware
exploits ShellShock and some known CCTV vulnerabilities to
spread from device to device.
B. Compromising IoT devices via device-to-device links
Malware can also propagate in proximity via device-to-
device links in additional to infrastructure links. Cabir and
Commwarror are examples of mobile worms that spread via
Bluetooth and infect mobile phones running Symbian OS.
Although we have not witnessed device-to-device IoT mal-
ware in the wild, it is theoretically possible. For example,
researchers pointed out the possibility of light bulb worms that
spread to nearby bulbs via Zigbee [5] and worms that infect
wearable trackers and then spread to others by Bluetooth.6
Moreover, since proximity-based wireless interfaces are often
always-on and users have no control to disable them, it would
be difficult to contain malware propagation given the large
attack surface.
Regardless of how malware propagates, the risk of self-
replicating IoT malware is amplified by unpatched IoTs. Patch-
ing vulnerable IoT devices nevertheless remains extremely
expensive and far from successful in practice. In 2015, Charlie
Miller and Chris Valasek demonstrated remote exploitation of
4https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA16-288A
5https://www.pentestpartners.com/blog/thermostat-ransomware-a-lesson-in-
iot-security/
6http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/10/21/fitbit hack/
a Jeep, which forced Chrysler to recall and patch 1.4 million
vehicles.7 Cui and Stolfo [9] discovered more than 540,000
publicly accessible devices using default root passwords—
an old yet persisting vulnerability since the invention of
password-based authentication. Worse yet, the problems en-
countered when patching computers and mobile phones (e.g.,
privacy, legacy devices, and lack of incentives) will linger and
even exacerbate when attempting to patch IoT devices.
III. MODELING OF IOT MALWARE
The topic of modeling malware/virus spreading has been
investigated in a traditional scenario where computers or
laptops are not connected to the Internet. Since the spread of
epidemics among people is similar to the spread of malware
over networks, the current literature adopts the idea from
epidemiological models to build the models for malware on
the assumption of homogeneous infection path [10]. In the
mobile environment, malware can propagate via intermittently
connected networks by taking advantage of opportunistic en-
counters [11]. Wang et al. [12] study spreading patterns of
mobile phone viruses which may traverse through multime-
dia messaging services (MMS) or Bluetooth by simulations.
Cheng and Chen [13] further models malware propagation
in generalized social networks consisting of delocalized and
localized links.
From the discussion of the previous section, we understand
that in practice patching the compromised IoT devices is
difficult to be achieved. Consequently, the current formulation
of malware propagation and the control model [14] can not
be applied directly in the IoT field. Typically, in one of
the most famous susceptible-infection-recover (SIR) model,
the malware is assumed to be detected and repaired at each
node, which reflects the transition from “infected” state to
“recovered” state. Regarding the IoT device who detects the
malware, instead of directly patching it, it is more feasible to
patch on the infrastructure side to prevent further spreading
of malware. In this case, compromised IoT devices located
in the coverage area of the patched intermediate nodes are
controlled, that is, malware cannot be propagated via patched
intermediate nodes. As a result, the infrastructure links can be
regarded as “recovered” while the compromised IoT device
remains “infected” using the terminology of SIR model. The
observation that malware control in IoT environment can be
cast as a “link recovery” problem instead of a “node recovery”
problem motivates a different development of modeling and
formulation.
IV. FEASIBLE PATCHING SCHEMES IN IOT ENVIRONMENT
This section proposes patching schemes for IoT environ-
ment, where we can only control infrastructure links but not
the compromised nodes themselves. The patching scheme con-
sists of several phases. In the detecting phase, infrastructure
leverages traditional IDS or firewall to identify the existence
of malware or compromised node. Once a malicious code is
found to be propagated from the compromised IoT devices,
7https://www.wired.com/2015/07/hackers-remotely-kill-jeep-highway/
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Fig. 2. Illustration of malware propagation under the infrastructure patch scheme.
patching phase starts to analyze the malware and patches
the intermediate nodes according to patching sequence to
prevent the large-scale propagation of malware. In practice,
intermediate nodes are capable of performing resource inten-
sive tasks and thus can support over the air (OTA) update
mechanisms. In the patching phase, such OTA mechanisms
allow the administrator to remotely install required update on
the intermediate nodes, thereby ensuring timely mitigation of
compromised nodes. In addition, since intermediate nodes are
significantly fewer than IoT devices, the administrator can also
manually patch legacy intermediate nodes that do not support
OTA update.
Fig. 2 describes an example of how a compromised device
propagates malware in IoT environment with patched and
unpatched intermediate nodes. For the devices located in the
coverage area of the patched intermediate nodes, two possible
operations will be executed.
• Compromised devices can distribute malware via device-
to-device links but not infrastructure links. As shown
in step 1 of Fig. 2, the compromised device propagates
malware to devices b and c in the vicinity. However, in
step 2 of Fig. 2, device b cannot propagate malware via
infrastructure link since the malware is blocked at the
patched BS.
• Normal devices can only be compromised via device-to-
device links since the malware propagated from infras-
tructure will be identified and blocked by the patched
intermediate nodes. For example, in step 3 of Fig. 2,
device d propagates malware from BS 2 to BS 1, however,
the patched BS 1 will not relay the malware to any device
in its coverage area.
For the devices located in the coverage area of the unpatched
intermediate nodes, there are no means to prevent malware
propagation. For example, in step 2 of Fig. 2, device c under
unpatched BS 3 could infect device d controlled by unpatched
BS 2 via infrastructure links. Moreover, device a moving from
patched BS 1 to unpatched BS 2 could propagate malware via
device-to-device links freely.
Algorithm 1 Traffic-aware Patching
Input: The set of intermediate nodes, SAP ; The time to
start patching, tp; The percentage of patched intermediate
nodes, p
1: if currentT ime < tp then
2: Collect traffic information for each intermediate node
3: else
4: if currentT ime >= tp then
5: Sort intermediate nodes according to the
6: importance metric in descending traffic order
7: Patch top p% SAP
8: end if
9: end if
Algorithm 1 describes the detailed steps in patching phase.
With limited resources and efforts, the operator could provide
a fixed amount of patches on the intermediate nodes (e.g.,
p percentage). To alleviate the propagation from the infras-
tructure links, the p% most important intermediate nodes will
be chosen for patching. It is similar to the idea of protecting
the most important node to maintain network robustness [7].
As a result, we introduce the traffic monitoring duration (see
lines 1-2 in Algorithm 1) for evaluating the importance of
intermediate nodes. From the monitored results, the proposed
traffic-aware patching scheme sorts the intermediate nodes in
descending order according to the traffic volumes (see lines
5-6 in Algorithm 1), and the top p% intermediate nodes are
patched (see line 7 in Algorithm 1).
Obvious, the proposed volume-based patching is effective to
the attack which generates a large number of traffic volume,
e.g., DDoS attacks. The patched intermediate nodes could
prevent the redirection of malicious traffic introduced by the
DDoS attack launched by the IoT botnets.
5V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we implement the proposed traffic-aware
patching scheme and compare its performance with a random-
ized patching scheme on real-life traffic traces collected from
a mobile social network consisting of 59 users (devices) and
1751 APs [15]. In this network, each user can communicate
with other users through two types of links: (1) an infrastruc-
ture link via (possibly multiple) APs, and (2) a direct device-
to-device link to users within transmission range. These two
types of links among users are similar to the illustration of
mobile IoT in Fig. 1. As we mentioned in previous sections,
in this experiment infrastructure links can be made secure via
patching, whereas direct device-to-device links are vulnerable
to potential security threats.
Following the vulnerability analysis of transmissive at-
tacks in [3], we simulate the propagation dynamics of self-
replication malicious codes by first randomly selecting a user
in the network as the initially compromised device. Then,
using the actual traces of communication patterns provided
by the dataset [15], each infected device can compromise its
contact through an infrastructure link with probability λinf, and
can compromise its contact through a direct device-to-device
link with probability λdir. Specifically, if one of the APs in the
communication path between one infected device to its contact
has been successfully patched, then the malware propagation
is in vain due to enhanced security.
For traffic-aware patching, we are interested in investigating
the trade-offs between the time spent in analyzing traffic
volumes (i.e., the traffic monitoring duration) and the time
instance to patch APs (i.e., the patch time). As described
in the previous section, given a fixed amount of patches,
the proposed traffic-aware patching scheme sorts the APs in
descending order according to the traffic volumes in the traffic
monitoring duration, and provides patches to the top APs.
Intuitively, longer traffic monitoring duration better specifies
the important APs in communicating devices. However, longer
traffic monitoring duration also leads to more exploits in secu-
rity vulnerabilities due to later patch time. As a result, given
a fixed amount of patches, we aim to study the non-trivial
optimal patch time that collects sufficient traffic information
for patching while minimizing the security risks.
Fig. 3 shows the fraction of compromised users with respect
to different patch time and patched APs under the traffic-
aware patching scheme. To demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed traffic-aware patching scheme, Fig. 4 further
compares the difference of compromised users between the
no-patching scheme and the traffic-aware scheme. It can be
observed that the best patching strategy that leads to a maximal
decrease in the number of compromised users compared
with the no-patching scheme is to monitor the traffics for
40 seconds and then provide patches to all APs. Note that
100% patched APs (i.e., securing all infrastructure links) with
patch time 0 may not be the optimal patch strategy since
the malicious codes are still able to propagate through direct
device-to-decide links. To further understand the effect of
traffic-aware patching, for a given fraction of patched APs,
Fig. 5 shows the optimal patch time that leads to the lowest
total number of compromised users. We observe that if one is
able to patch more APs, then late patch time can have better
performance, which suggests that traffic volumes are indeed
important information for patching.
For fair comparison, we also compare the performance
of traffic-aware patching with random patching. Random
patching provides immediate patches (i.e., has patch time 0
) and randomly selects a fraction of APs to patch. Fig. 6
shows the difference between the fraction of compromised
users under random patching to that of traffic-aware patching,
where larger positive values imply traffic-aware patching is
more effective in securing the network, and vice versa. We
observe that traffic-aware patching is significantly better than
random patching in the regime of few patched APs (e.g., below
30%). Moreover, given a fixed fraction of patched APs, for
traffic-aware patching, there is at least one patch time that
leads to either better or identical performance compared with
random patching, which suggests the robustness and reliability
of the proposed patching scheme. Even in the regime of
many patched APs (e.g., above 90%), the performance of
traffic-aware patching is still superior to random patching,
which suggests the importance of patching APs of high traffic
volumes for enhanced security.
VI. SOME ONGOING CHALLENGES AND OPEN RESEARCH
QUESTIONS
Here we discuss several ongoing challenges and open
research questions related to IoT malware propagation and
patching.
• Transfer learning for optimal patch time.
In the experiments, we find that the patch time is cru-
cial to preventing malware propagation. How to design
and simulate realistic testbeds to assist determining the
optimal patch time and to enable transfer learning for
defending real-life unknown security threats are ongoing
challenges.
• Predictive malware propagation models for mobile
IoT.
In this article, we have addressed patching issues in
mobile IoT as link recovery instead of node recovery,
where the latter has been extensively studied in traditional
wireless networking scenarios. How to establish effective
mathematical models for predicting malware propagation
dynamics in mobile IoT that take into account the traffic-
aware and random patching schemes are new research
challenges.
• Various importance metrics for intermediate nodes.
The proposed scheme simply applies traffic volume as
the metric to determine the importance of intermediate
nodes and the patching sequence. It can be regarded as
protecting the entire network by patching a relatively
small fraction of intermediate nodes with the highest
“degree” metric. The operator could consider more infor-
mation about intermediate nodes, such as the topology of
intermediate nodes, in order to design a more effective
importance metric for determining the patching sequence.
For example, the “betweenness” metric could be lever-
aged, which is defined as the fraction of all shortest
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paths passing through the node among all shortest paths
between each node pair in the network.
• Patching via path-based traffic patterns. The proposed
traffic-aware patching scheme only considers the one-hop
traffic information in terms of the traffic volume from IoT
devices to intermediate nodes. The patching scheme could
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benefit from the knowledge beyond one-hop information,
such as the path-based end-to-end traffic patterns. How-
ever, path-based traffic patterns are relatively difficult to
be collected or acquired compared to the one-hop traffic
information.
• How to achieve (virtually) patch? IoT devices often
lack friendly user interfaces and are left unattended
after installation. As a consequence, users have trouble
knowing whether a device is hacked, and even they do,
they may find it challenging to manually patch the device:
they need to retrieve updated firmware online, access the
hacked device, install the firmware, etc. Thus, automatic
patching is needed to secure IoT at scale.
One promising direction is for IoT devices to support
Firmware Over The Air (FOTA), as most PCs and mobile
phones do nowadays. However, an efficient and secure
FOTA for IoT remains an open challenge due to the
heterogeneity of IoT networks. For example, transport
security and code signing are required to ensure the
authenticity of the updated firmware. The IoT gateway
might help reduce the overhead by caching and offloading
the security check. Moreover, the human factors need to
be taken into consideration as well. As in the PC and
mobile phone worlds, forcing software update without
explicit user consent can be disastrous. It can even be
life-threatening if the update happens at a wrong time
(e.g., updating the vehicle while driving).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This article considers the security threats incurred by the
heterogeneous links of IoT and designs a novel patching
scheme to alleviate malware propagation. Instead of the
impractical solution of directly patching compromised IoT
devices, we propose to patch important intermediate nodes
based on the traffic volumes to prevent major security exploits
and to avoid catastrophic malware propagation. With the
proposed traffic-aware patching scheme, malware propagation
is restricted to direct device-to-device connection, and there-
fore the damage of malware propagation can be significantly
reduced. We conduct experiments in IoT environment to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed traffic-aware
patching scheme, and we also discuss some ongoing research
challenges and open research questions related to IoT patching.
The proposed traffic-aware patching scheme and the experi-
mental results bring new insights to IoT security. For instance,
the infeasibility of direct patching on IoT devices calls for
new IoT malware models and security assessment approaches.
The experimental results can assist in developing new attack
detection techniques and patching strategies for preventing
malware propagation. Obviously, the resource-constrained,
user-unfriendly, and heterogeneous features of IoT devices
hinder the security design and development for IoT. However,
the experimental results indicate a promising method to secure
the entire IoT system by patching intermediate nodes. In
summary, we provide two guidelines for how to consider cyber
security when designing IoT systems accordingly:
• The consideration of intermediate nodes that bridge the
gap between resource-constrained IoT devices and pow-
erful IoT application servers is necessary when design-
ing cyber security for IoT. By shifting computation-
consuming, security related functionalities (e.g., flow
identification, filtering, and isolation) to intermediate
nodes, they can play the roles of the onsite guards. In
particular, the flexibility and reconfigurability of inter-
mediate nodes could easily introduce patches and updates
to mitigate the IoT malware propagation or attacks in a
timely manner.
• The future cyber security solution for IoT should take
into the consideration that adversaries might leverage
IoT devices with unpatched vulnerabilities to propagate
malware via device-to-device links. In other words, the
security mechanisms developed for IoT shall coexist with
insecure, unpatched legacy IoT devices with uncontrolled
device-to-device channels. A notification mechanism is
suggested to help users identify the IoT devices at risk
and further deny possible device-to-device connections.
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